[APWSLMembers 486] KMU's reaction on Philip Alston's findings

[KMU International Department]

Dear friends,

Please find below the KMU News Release re UN Special Rapporteur
Philip Alston's  findings.  We have likewise attached a copy of Alston's
press statement.

KMU International Dept

KMU NEWS RELEASE
February 22, 2007

UN Rapporteur, Melo Commission findings point to AFP as culprits

“The recently secret Melo Commission report only confirmed the
separate findings of Prof. Alston that the AFP is to blame for the ongoing
bloodbath.  Despite this, Gen. Esperon remains in denial and sticks by
his spin that it was the NPA who are to blame.”

This was the reaction of Joel Maglunsod, Secretary-General of the
Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) Labor Center and Anakpawis Partylist
nominee to the press conference called by Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon this morning
in reaction to the findings of Prof. Philip Alston regarding extra judicial
killings in the Philippines.

“The families of the 76 unionists and labor activists, along with the rest of
the more than 800 victims are still crying out for just resolution and this
action by Gen. Esperon only rubs salt on the wound of the victims and
their survivors, to which up-to-date justice remains elusive.

Esperon continues red-baiting, sets-up legal organizations for physical
attack

“Gen. Esperon continues with his red-baiting by insinuating that KMU is a
front of the NPA by showing an undated video of Jose Maria Sison
talking about legal democratic forces in the Philippines.  Since our
establishment in May 1, 1980, the KMU remained and continue to be a
legal labor center with federations and local unions under its wing.  We
do not have underground organizations behind us as was implied by
Gen. Esperon.  But despite us being a legal organization, our leaders
and members continue to be murdered by state-sponsored death
squads,” opined Maglunsod.

Maglunsod also pointed out the recent murder of student leader of the
League of Filipino Students (LFS) Farly Alcantara II of Mercedes,
Camarines Norte.  The LFS, along with BAYAN, Gabriela, Kilusang
Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) and KMU were mentioned in the video
released by the AFP.

Esperon praises Akbayan partylist

“We were not surprised by the continued praises for Akbayan by Gen.
Esperon.  The vilification campaign of Akbayan calling progressive
organizations like the KMU as NPA supporters are in tune with the
red-baiting strategy of the AFP.  As they say, birds of the same feather
flock together,” stated Maglunsod.

“Just recently, Akbayan members filed to disqualify Bayan Muna,
Anakpawis and Gabriela on murder charges, yet their suspects were the
NPA.  They keep linking these partylists to the NPA and this has set-up
many of our members for physical attacks.  Akbayan should stop and
apologize to the victims for their continued red-baiting,” ended
Maglunsod.  ###

PRESS STATEMENT

Professor Philip Alston, Special
Rapporteur of the United Nations Human
Rights Council on extrajudicial, summary
or arbitrary executions.

Manila, 21 February 2007

I have spent the past ten days in the Philippines at the invitation of the
Government in order to inquire into the phenomenon of extrajudicial
executions. I am very grateful to the Government for the unqualified
cooperation extended to me. During my stay here I have met with
virtually all of the relevant senior officials of Government. They include
the President, the Executive Secretary, the National Security Adviser,
the Secretaries for Defence, Justice, DILG and the Peace Process. I
have also met with a significant number of members of Congress on
different sides of the political spectrum, the Chief Justice, the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the Chair of the
Human Rights Commission, the Ombudsman, the members of both
sides of the Joint Monitoring Committee, and representatives of the
MNLF and MILF. Of particular relevance to my specific concerns, I also
met with Task Force Usig, and with the Melo Commission, and I have
received the complete dossier compiled by TF Usig, as well as the
report of the Melo Commission, the and the responses to its findings by
the AFP and by retired Maj-Gen Palparan. I have also visited Baguio
and Davao and met with the regional Human Rights Commission
offices, local PNP and AFP commanders, and the Mayor of Davao,
among others.

Equally importantly, roughly half of my time here was devoted to
meetings with representatives of civil society, in Manila, Baguio, and
Davao. Through their extremely valuable contributions in the form of
documentation and detailed testimony I have learned a great deal.
Let me begin by acknowledging several important elements. The first is
that the Government's invitation to visit reflects a clear recognition of  the
gravity of the problem, a willingness to permit outside scrutiny, and a
very welcome preparedness to engage on this issue. The assurances
that I received from the President, in particular, were very encouraging.
Second, I note that my visit takes place within the context of a
counter-insurgency operation which takes place on a range of fronts,
and I do not in any way underestimate the resulting challenges facing for
the  Government and the AFP. Third, I wish to clarify that my formal role is
to report to the UN Human Rights Council and to the Government on the
situation I have found. I consider that the very fact of my visit has already
begun the process of acting as a catalyst to deeper reflection on these
issues both within the national and international settings. Finally, I must
emphasise that the present statement is only designed to give a
general indication of some, but by no means all, of the issues to be
addressed, and the recommendations put forward, in my final report. I
expect that will be available sometime within the next three months.

Sources of information
The first major challenge for my mission was to obtain detailed and well
supported information. I have been surprised by both the amount and
the quality of information provided to me. Most key Government
agencies are organized and systematic in much of their data collection
and classification. Similarly, Philippines civil society organizations are
generally sophisticated and professional. I sought, and obtained,
meetings across the entire political spectrum. I leave the Philippines with
a wealth of information to be processed in the preparation of my final
report.

But the question has still been posed as to whether the information
provided to me by either all, or at least certain, local NGO groups can
be considered reliable. The word 'propaganda' was used by many of
my interlocutors. What I took them to mean was that the overriding goal
of the relevant groups in raising EJE questions was to gain political
advantage in the context of a broader battle for public opinion and
power, and that the HR dimensions were secondary at best. Some went
further to suggest that many of the cases were fabricated, or at least
trumped up, to look more serious than they are.

I consider it essential to respond to these concerns immediately. First,
there is inevitably a propaganda element in such allegations. The aim is
to win public sympathy and to discredit other actors. But the existence of
a propaganda dimension does not, in itself, destroy the credibility of the
information and allegations. I would insist, instead, on the need to apply
several tests relating to credibility.  First, is 
it only NGOs from one part of
the political spectrum who are making these allegations? The  answer is
clearly 'no'. Human rights groups in the Philippines range across the
entire spectrum in terms of their political sympathies, but I met no groups
who challenged the basic fact that large numbers of extrajudicial
executions are taking place, even if they disagreed on precise figures.
Second, how compelling is the actual information presented? I found
there was considerable variation ranging from submissions which were
entirely credible and contextually aware all the way down to some which
struck me as superficial and dubious. But the great majority are closer to
the top of that spectrum than to the bottom. Third, has the information
proved credible under 'cross-examination'. My colleagues and I heard
a large number of cases in depth and we probed the stories presented
to us in order to ascertain their accuracy and the broader context.

As a result, I believe that I have gathered a huge amount of data and
certainly much more than has been made available to any one of the
major national inquiries.

Extent of my focus

My focus goes well beyond that adopted by either TF Usig or the Melo
Commission, both of which are concerned essentially with political and
media killings. Those specific killings are, in many ways, a symptom of
a much more extensive problem and we should not permit our focus to
be limited artificially. The TF Usig/Melo scope of inquiry is inappropriate
for me for several reasons:

(a) The approach is essentially reactive. It is not based on an original
assessment of what is going on in the country at large, but rather on what
a limited range of CSOs report. As a result, the focus then is often shifted
(unhelpfully) to the orientation of the CSO, the quality of the
documentation in particular cases, etc.;

(b) Many killings are not reported, or not pursued, and for good reason;
and

(c) A significant proportion of acknowledged cases of 'disappearances'
involve individuals who have been killed but who are not reflected in the
figures.

How many have been killed?

The numbers game is especially unproductive, although a source of
endless fascination. Is it 25, 100, or 800? I don't have a figure. But I am
certain that the number is high enough to be distressing. Even more
importantly, numbers are not what count.  The impact of even a limited
number of killings of the type alleged is corrosive in many ways. It
intimidates vast numbers of civil society actors, it sends a message of
vulnerability to all but the most well connected, and it severely
undermines the political discourse which is central to a resolution of the
problems confronting this country.

Permit me to make a brief comment on the term 'unexplained killings',
which is used by officials and which I consider to be inapt and
misleading. It may be appropriate in the context of a judicial process but
human rights inquiries are more broad-ranging and one does not have
to wait for a court to secure a conviction before one can conclude that
human rights violations are occurring. The term 'extrajudicial killings'
which has a long pedigree is far more accurate and should be used.

Typology

It may help to specify the types of killing which are of particular
concern in the Philippines:
· Killings by military and police, and by the NPA or other groups, in
course of counter-insurgency. To the extent that such killings take place
in conformity with the rules of international humanitarian law they fall
outside my mandate.
· Killings not in the course of any armed engagement but in pursuit of a
specific counter-insurgency operation in the field.
· Killings, whether attributed to the military, 
the police, or private actors, of
activists associated with leftist groups and usually deemed or assumed
to be covertly assisting CPP-NPA-NDF. Private actors include hired
thugs in the pay of politicians, landowners, corporate interests, and
others.
· Vigilante, or death squad, killings
· Killings of journalists and other media persons.
· 'Ordinary' murders facilitated by the sense of impunity that exists.

Response by the Government
The response of Government to the crisis of extrajudicial executions
varies dramatically. There has been a welcome acknowledgement of
the seriousness of the problem at the very top. At the executive level the
messages have been very mixed and often unsatisfactory. And at the
operational level, the allegations have too often been met with a
response of incredulity, mixed with offence.

Explanations proffered
When I have sought explanations of the killings I have received a range
of answers.

(i) The allegations are essentially propaganda. I have addressed this
dimension already.

(ii) The allegations are fabricated. Much importance was attached to two
persons who had been listed as killed, but who were presented to me
alive.  Two errors, in circumstances which might partly explain the
mistakes, do very little to discredit the vast number of remaining
allegations.

(iii) The theory that the 'correct, accurate, and truthful' reason for the
recent rise in killings lies in purges committed by the CPP/NPA. This
theory was relentlessly pushed by the AFP and many of my Government
interlocutors. But we must distinguish the number of 1,227 cited by the
military from the limited number of cases in which the CPP/NPA have
acknowledged, indeed boasted, of killings. While such cases have
certainly occurred, even those most concerned about them, such as
members of Akbayan, have suggested to me that they could not amount
to even 10% of the total killings.
The evidence offered by the military in support of this theory is
especially unconvincing. Human rights organizations have documented
very few such cases. The AFP relies instead on figures and trends
relating to the purges of the late 1980s, and on an alleged CPP/NPA
document captured in May 2006 describing Operation Bushfire. In the
absence of much stronger supporting evidence this particular document
bears all the hallmarks of a fabrication and cannot be taken as
evidence of anything other than disinformation.

(iv) Some killings may have been attributable to the AFP, but they were
committed by rogue elements. There is little doubt that some such
killings have been committed. The AFP needs to give us precise details
and to indicate what investigations and prosecutions have been
undertaken in response. But, in any event, the rogue elephant theory
does not explain or even address the central questions with which we
are concerned.

Some major challenges for the future

(a) Acknowledgement by the AFP
The AFP remains in a state of almost total denial (as its official
response to the Melo Report amply demonstrates) of its need to
respond effectively and authentically to the significant number of killings
which have been convincingly attributed to them. The President needs
to persuade the military that its reputation and effectiveness will be
considerably enhanced, rather than undermined, by acknowledging the
facts and taking genuine steps to investigate. When the Chief of the AFP
contents himself with telephoning Maj-Gen Palparan three times in order
to satisfy himself that the persistent and extensive allegations against
the General were entirely unfounded, rather than launching a thorough
internal investigation, it is clear that there is still a very long way to go.

(b) Moving beyond the Melo Commission
It is not for me to evaluate the Melo Report. That is for the people of
the Philippines to do. The President showed good faith in responding to
allegations by setting up an independent commission. But the political
and other capital that should have followed is being slowly but surely
drained away by the refusal to publish the report. The justifications
given are unconvincing. The report was never intended to be
preliminary or interim. The need to get 'leftists' to testify is no reason to
withhold a report which in some ways at least vindicates their claims.
And extending a Commission whose composition has never succeeded
in winning full cooperation seems unlikely to cure the problems still
perceived by those groups. Immediate release of the report is an
essential first step.

(c) The need to restore accountability
The focus on TF Usig and Melo is insufficient. The enduring and much
larger challenge is to restore the various accountability mechanisms
that the Philippines Constitution and Congress have put in place over the
years, too many of which have been systematically drained of their force
in recent years. I will go into detail in my 
final report, but suffice it to note
for present purposes that Executive Order 464, and its replacement,
Memorandum Circular 108, undermine significantly the capacity of
Congress to hold the executive to account in any meaningful way.

(d) Witness protection
The vital flaw which undermines the utility of much of the judicial system
is the problem of virtual impunity that prevails. This, in turn, is built upon
the rampant problem of witness vulnerability. The present message is
that if you want to preserve your life expectancy, don't act as a witness
in a criminal prosecution for killing. Witnesses are systematically
intimidated and harassed. In a relatively poor society, in which there is
heavy dependence on community and very limited real geographical
mobility, witnesses are uniquely vulnerable when the forces accused of
killings are all too often those, or are linked to those, who are charged
with ensuring their security. The WPP is impressive - on paper. In
practice, however, it is deeply flawed and would seem only to be truly
effective in a very limited number of cases. The result, as one expert
suggested to me, is that 8 out of 10 strong cases, or 80% fail to move
from the initial investigation to the actual prosecution stage.

(e) Acceptance of the need to provide legitimate political space for
leftist groups At the national level, there has been a definitive
abandonment of President Ramos' strategy of reconciliation. This might
be termed the Sinn Fein strategy. It involves the creation of an opening ­
the party-list system ­ for leftist groups to enter the democratic political
system, while at the same time acknowledging that some of those
groups remain very sympathetic to the armed struggle being waged by
illegal groups (the IRA in the Irish case, or the NPA in the Philippines
case).  The goal is to provide an incentive for such groups to enter
mainstream politics and to see that path as their best option.

Neither the party-list system nor the repeal of the Anti-Subversion Act
has been reversed by Congress. But, the executive branch, openly and
enthusiastically aided by the military, has worked resolutely to
circumvent the spirit of these legislative decisions by trying to impede
the work of the party-list groups and to put in question their right to
operate freely. The idea is not to destroy the NPA but to eliminate
organizations that support many of its goals and do not actively disown
its means. While non-violent in conception, there are cases in which it
has, certainly at the local level, spilled over into decisions to
extrajudicially execute those who cannot be reached by legal process.

(f) Re-evaluate problematic aspects of counter-insurgency strategy
The increase in extrajudicial executions in recent years is attributable,
at least in part, to a shift in counterinsurgency strategy that occurred
in some areas, reflecting the considerable regional variation in the
strategies employed, especially with respect to the civilian population.
In some areas, an appeal to hearts-and-minds is combined with an
attempt to vilify left-leaning organizations and to intimidate leaders of
such organizations. In some instances, such intimidation escalates into
extrajudicial execution. This is a grave and serious problem and one
which I intend to examine in detail in my final report.


Conclusion

The Philippines remains an example to all of us in terms of the peaceful
ending of martial law by the People's Revolution, and the adoption of a
Constitution reflecting a powerful commitment to ensure respect for
human rights. The various measures ordered by the President in
response to Melo constitute important first steps, but there is a huge
amount that remains to be done. ###